Uneasy Tensions Between Children\u27s Rights and Civil Rights by Appell, Annette Ruth
UNEASY TENSIONS BETWEEN
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Annette Ruth Appell*
This essay begins an exploration of the opposition between, and intersec-
tion of, children's rights and civil rights. Children's rights, a phrase I will
define and explore more fully below, are sometimes placed under the umbrella
of the civil rights movement. Children's rights to equal protection in education,
protections against arbitrary state action, and limited freedom of speech and
reproductive control, are tied to civil rights historically and conceptually. Yet
many other children's rights, such as the right to protection, support and con-
tinuity in a caregiver, arise out of the child protection strain of parens patriae
doctrine, a tradition essentially aimed at social control, rather than tolerance or
liberation, of non-dominant1 populations and, of course, women. The chil-
dren's rights movement thus has aspects that are liberating or empowering but
also, I hypothesize, aspects that derive from and even reinforce conditions and
rhetoric that undermine liberty. Moreover, these non-liberatory aspects of the
children's rights movement may undermine the civil rights of adults.
In this essay, I explore the various faces of children's rights in the context
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).2 This Symposium's occasion and
location in Las Vegas, Nevada provides a fresh setting for exploration of these
tensions. Nevada gained statehood in 1865 to bolster the Union3 in the war that
would outlaw slavery, a status that denied its holder basic civil rights - to vote,
to own property, to rear his or her own children. Nevada is also a state with
fourteen Indian Reservations in a portion of the country to which Native Amer-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. My
gratitude goes to Lynne Henderson for organizing this symposium and affording me the
opportunity to bring the topic of children's rights into this discussion of civil rights, Marty
Geer for his helpful guidance on an earlier draft, David Tanenhaus for his ability to relate the
past and present so thoughtfully, and Nancy Heimerle, Patrick Murch and Cheryl Self for
their research assistance.
I I use "non-dominant" and "dominant" to reflect the power of, and normative judgments
reflecting, groups and values. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion:
Reconceptualizing the Role of Judge in a Pluralistic Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 160-205
(1999) (describing differences between dominant epistemologies and differences between
dominant and nondominant world-views); see also Annette R. Appell, Virtual Mothers and
the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 683, 780-86 (2001) (describing domi-
nant and non-dominant norms in the family context). Although non-dominant is often
synonymous with minority groups, I generally reserve the terms "minority" and "majority"
in this article for age, not demographic or racial minorities, unless specifically indicated.
2 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000).
3 See Michael W. Bowers, THE SAGEBRUSH STATE: NEVADA'S HISTORY, GOVERNMENT,
AND PoLITIcsl5, 23, 29 (2d. ed. 2002). The territory containing Las Vegas belonged to
Arizona until 1867. Id. at 24.
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icans were sent to make way for white settlers east of the Mississippi.4 Today,
the western United States is home to nearly one-half of the Native American
and Alaskan Native population.5
Las Vegas, which sits in Clark County, is a metropolitan area with 1.6
million residents, up from just 273,000 residents in 1970.6 This phenomenal
growth has produced what looks like a city, at least by western United States
standards, but with a social and legal infrastructure struggling to meet the
growth. The Clark County Juvenile Court, where civil cases involving charges
of abuse and neglect are heard, operated much like an old fashioned social
work court when I first arrived in 1998. The explosion of lawyers and procedu-
ral protections in these proceedings, promoted by federal funding law, had not
reached Southern Nevada. Few children, and fewer parents, received legal rep-
resentation. Since 1998, I have seen, and been part of, the creation of the Chil-
dren's Attorneys Project, which now provides six lawyers to represent children
in abuse and neglect proceedings, and the Family Defense Project, which pro-
vides two attorneys to represent parents in such proceedings. Parental and chil-
dren's rights are being pressed consistently for the first time in Southern
Nevada. This new advocacy has come to a head around the protections the
ICWA affords Indian children, their families, and their tribes.
Prior to the existence of specialized parental rights attorneys, the state and
county child welfare agencies and the court disregarded the ICWA in many (if
not most) cases to which it applied.7 When a number of these cases came to
the attention of the specially trained parents' attorneys, pursuant to the ICWA,
they moved to vacate the earlier rulings. These vacations in turn led to reunifi-
cation of children with their parents or extended family or transfer of jurisdic-
tion to the appropriate tribal court. The children's attorneys have expressed
concerns about these changes and are considering strategies to undermine the
ICWA's privilege of Indian heritage, parental rights, and tribal authority. Thus,
perhaps for the first time in Southern Nevada, the civil rights of parents against
4 Nevada State Library and Archives, Location of Native American Areas in Nevada, http:/!
dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nsla/sdc/native/Indian_map.htm, (last visited Aug. 30, 2004). See
Indian Removal Act, Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411-12 (1830) (providing for the removal of Native
Americans living east of the Mississippi River to the west of that river to make room for
European American settlers). Of course, Native Americans lived in Nevada for centuries
(millennia) before the relocation of eastern tribes. Bowers, supra note 3, at 1. Current
census figures place the number of Native Americans in Nevada at 26,725. Census Bureau,
American Community Survey of 2002 General Demographic Characteristics, Nevada 2002
(last revised Sept. 2, 2003), http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Products/Profiles/Single/2002/
ACS/Tabular/040/04000US321.htm, (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
5 Census Bureau, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2000, Census 2000
Brief 6, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01- 15-pdf, (last visited Apr. 7, 2004.
No other region in the country has a higher percentage of American Indians and Alaska
Natives. Id.
6 Launce Rake, Task Force on Growth to Focus Most on County, LAS VEGAS SUN, Feb. 3,
2004, at 2B. Due to the extraordinary rate of growth in Nevada, this number will surely be
outdated by the time this paper is published.
, This phenomenon is not unique to Nevada. See Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Col-
lective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 4 (1990) ("last
year in New Mexico, state courts ignored the mandates of the ICWA in seventy cases");
H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 2 (1996) (noting failure of Alaska state social workers to notify
tribes in 52.7 percent of cases reviewed).
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state intervention into their parenthood and the rights of children, as understood
by their advocates, are systematically in explicit opposition. Moreover, as the
children's bar in Nevada evolves, these types of conflicts no doubt will increase
just as they have in other parts of the country.
The perceived conflicts between children's interests and parents' rights
under the ICWA are a ripple in a larger and longer-standing tension between
protecting children's rights and civil rights. The fact that we even have attor-
neys to represent children is a recent phenomenon arising out of at least two
originally separate movements: the child protection and civil rights movements.
The child protection movement began in the mid-nineteenth century, though its
historical roots date to colonial times,8 and has spawned a massive governmen-
tal and legal industry to protect and advocate for children, an industry of which
I have been part since 1988. The civil rights movement, beginning arguably
with advocacy for and finally abolition of slavery through the Thirteenth
Amendment, reinforced by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
reaching its peak during the third quarter of the twentieth century, produced the
legal doctrine and climate for the notion that children have the right to be free
from arbitrary (including invidious race-based) governmental treatment. This
movement has also led to the creation of lawyers for children who continue to
press for children's rights in criminal courts, juvenile justice proceedings and
reproductive choice.
Although the lawyers for both strands of the children's rights movement
may overlap and the notions of civil rights and dependency are present in each,
these two strands have distinct histories and purposes that are at odds with each
other. The protective strand is rooted in challenges to, and continues to
threaten, what we now consider to be the fundamental civil rights of poor fami-
lies, especially families of color. The civil rights strand is rooted in opposition
to race-based or coercive state intervention in private ordering and civic partici-
pation, including the creation and maintenance of family relationships.
This essay explores the distinctions between children's dependency rights
and civil rights. The second section rehearses the role and primacy of parental
rights as civil rights in a liberal republican democracy,9 illustrating the point
with the government's historic, value-based disruption of Native American
families and culture. The third section compares children's civil and depen-
dency rights and the development and growth of children's rights, with particu-
lar attention to the child protection movement and Native American children.
That section explains how children's dependency rights and civil rights diverge
and conflict. The final section draws distinctions between children's depen-
8 Of course, we inherited parens patriae from England. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of
the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
9 I use the phrase "liberal, republican democracy" to designate the United States' form of
government and its philosophical underpinnings. M.N.S. SELLERS, THE SACRED FIRE OF
LIBERTY: REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM AND THE LAW 22, 23-27, 99-102 (1998); Laura Kal-
man, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 87, 104 (1997) (acknowledging the "growing sense of historians that 'liberalism'
and 'republicanism' did not stand in sharp opposition to each other at the Founding and that
the debate between them is 'sterile'"); see also Appell, supra note 1, at 689-90 n.15 (high-




dency and civil rights as vehicles for liberation and cautions against reflexive
extensions of dependency rights under rubrics of liberty and justice.
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS AS CIVIL RIGHTS: NATIVE AMERICAN CONTEXT
The primary adult civil right this paper addresses is the right to rear chil-
dren, a right fundamental to membership in a liberal democracy.' Professor
Peggy Cooper Davis has demonstrated how the right to rear children was, and
still is, integral to the freedoms and protections contemplated by the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments.' l Professor Davis illustrated this point in her
rich and compelling exploration of the important historical, logical and legal
role freedom to rear one's own children played in the abolition of slavery.' 2
Professor Dorothy Roberts connects parental rights and civil rights through her
examination of the child welfare system's treatment of Black families. 13 Point-
ing to the disproportionate and punitive removal of Black children from their
mothers, Professor Roberts argues that family liberty, though in contemporary
parlance an individual right, is grounded in opposition to race-based oppres-
sion. 14 As such, the state's disproportionate removal of Black children from
their parents,' 5 despite its purportedly benign intention, constitutes a group-
based harm that interferes with "blacks' collective ability to overcome institu-
tionalized discrimination and work toward greater political and economic
strength."'16 I too have explored the political role of parental rights and their
centrality to liberal democracy which places the creation of moral value (within
liberal parameters) in private, not public, hands. 1' Parents thus have a funda-
mental right to rear their children according to private values and the state is
prohibited from interfering with individual families based on a disagreement
about those values as they relate to the child's interests."1 Thus the connection
between child rearing and civil rights relates both to moral and political auton-
omy and to the development and maintenance of political power.
I0 PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES
(1997) [hereinafter DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES]. The right to decide whether to bear a child
is often addressed as a civil right, but the right to rear children is often absent. See, e.g., A
READER ON RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN LAW, A MULTIRACIAL APPROACH
(Timothy Davis, et al. eds., 2001) (very rich anthology of over 800 pages that omits the topic
of child rearing).
I I E.g., DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 10; Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images
of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348 (1994).
12 DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, supra note 10, at 1324-57.
13 DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); Dor-
othy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171 (2003).
14 Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, supra note 13, at 179.
15 In some urban areas, from ten percent to a majority of families in Black neighborhoods
are involved in the child protection system. Id. at 179-80 (noting that in the Englewood
neighborhood in Chicago, a majority of families are involved in protective services and ten
percent of the children in Central Harlem in New York City are in foster care).
16 Id. at 179.
1i Appell, supra note 1, at 706-07.
18 Id. at 703-05.
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Indeed, a well-rehearsed line of United States Supreme Court cases
embraces this connection between parental and civil rights. 9 These cases have
established that parental rights are so fundamental that they demand special
protections against undue state interference or termination.20 These protections
are warranted, in part, because of the awesome resources of the state, particu-
larly against impoverished parents who cannot marshal the same resources or
expertise in proving parental worthiness. 2' The private interest at stake here is
the relationship between parent and child that the state has no interest in dis-
rupting unless the parent is unable or unfit to maintain the child. 22 Until this
time, the state does not have an interest in assessing or promoting a particular
child's interests because that assessment is integral to moral development
which is primarily a private endeavor under a liberal democratic scheme.23
This value-creation distinction between parent and state is particularly
cogent for Native American families whose bonds have been subject to brutal
disruption and whose culture has been so heavily and forcefully devalued under
color of law. The ICWA was a culturally sensitive attempt to preserve Native
American cultures through their most important resource - Indian children.2 4
In contrast to dominant mainstream cultural norms of nuclear families and indi-
vidual rights, the ICWA was designed to protect Native American expansive
conceptions of family, conceptions that did not include the notion of termina-
tion or transfer of parental rights. 25 The ICWA, through its promotion of
parental rights and tribal sovereignty, aims to protect the very civil existence of
Native Americans and tribal governance.2 6
There may be philosophical or cultural dissonance in placing Native
American families within constitutional family protections, particularly because
these protections are construed as individual rights and because the family is a
primary unit in the liberal republican philosophy undergirding the Constitu-
19 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20 E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996);
see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (hearing for putative father required before
state may remove children from his custody); but see Lassiter v. Dep't Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981) (mother has no per se right to counsel in termination of parental rights trial).
21 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
22 Id. at 760-61.
23 Appell, supra note 1, at 703-05; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003) (noting
the state does not have an interest in legislating morality).
24 This cultural preservation is also recognized as a human right of indigenous peoples in
international law. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism:
Where do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 365
(2003).
25 Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study in the Codification of the
Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 21, 36-39 (1997).
26 As Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Chief Calvin Isaac testified in support of the
ICWA, "[c]ulturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our childrei,
the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian
homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People. Furthermore, these practices seri-
ously undercut the tribes' ability to continue as self-governing communities." H.R. REP. No.
104-808, at 17 (1996) (citing Hearing on S. 1214, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1978)).
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tion. 27 Native American tribal cultures, on the contrary, are (or were) nearly
the antithesis of liberal individualism, organized instead collectively, subordi-
nating the individual to the whole2 8 and holding expansive concepts of fam-
ily. 29 Moreover, individual rights may threaten tribal sovereignty and tribal
preservation. 30 However, as described below, the physical and legal relation-
ships between Native Americans and federal and state governments make
Native American families extraordinarily vulnerable to state-sanctioned disrup-
tion and this disruption ultimately threatens the entire tribe.3 1 This vulnerabil-
ity arguably warrants liberal rights to protect the very cultures whose values
diverge from liberalism and rights discourse.3 2
It is well-known and documented that the European-Americans and lead-
ers view(ed) themselves as superior to Native Americans.3 3 In addition, law
and policy pertaining to Native Americans has ranged from slaughter and tribal
termination to containment and forced assimilation, with an occasional nod to
27 Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional Order, 77 TEx. L. REV.
1195, 1224-34 (1999).
28 Tsosie, supra note 24, at 372; see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and
Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577, 590 (2000) (noting tribal represent-
atives' testimony against the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(1994), for imposing Anglo-American values upon Native Americans); see also Atwood,
supra, at 604 (describing Winnebego Tribal court's approach to gender based equal protec-
tion claim).
29 See Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimi-
lation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 330-34, 341-43, 346-47 (1986) (describing differences
between white and American Indian family structures); H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 10 (1978)
(noting Native Americans may define families so expansively as to include hundreds of
"close relatives" and that Native Americans may even include community social workers as
family members); see also Atwood, supra note 28, (generally describing contemporary dif-
ferences between Anglo-American and tribal court approaches to family).
30 Tsosie, supra note 24, at 387-89 (discussing conflicts between tribalism and individual
constitutional rights); Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 889, 890-91 (2003) (describing tension between individual rights and tribal
revitalization).
31 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, approximately 2.4 million Native Americans
belong to at least one tribe. Census 2000 PHC-T-18, American Indian and Alaska Native
Tribes in the U.S.: 2000, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-tl8/tabOOl.pdf
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004). Over one-half million Native Americans live on reservations.
U.S. Census Bureau Facts for Features, American Indian/Alaska Native Heritage Month:
November 2002, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/cbO2ffl7.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2004).
32 See Tsosie, supra note 24, at 372-73, 375-76 (describing both the contingency of the
meaning of rights and the complex relationship of Native Americans to tribe and to Anglo-
American government); Goldberg, supra note 30, at 913 (exploring differences between tri-
bal and non-tribal understandings of individual liberty).
13 To put it mildly. George Washington, among others, equated Native Americans with
"beasts." THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 133-40 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938),
excerpted in RACE AND RACES 181 (Juan F. Perea, et al., eds., 2000). More mild dehumani-
zation characterized Native Americans as savages and unenlightened. See, e.g., Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1831) (Justice Johnson, in his concurrence referred to
"Indian tribes" as "wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and
having neither laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state"); but see also
id. at 53 (Justice Thompson, dissenting, describing Native Americans as self governing
"moral persons who live together in a natural society, under the laws of nations").
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self governance and economic support.34 The inability of the United States to
appreciate Native American values (and, therefore, culture) has historically,
and presently, produced a climate for coercive assimilation of American Indi-
ans. 35 Anglo-American legal hegemony3 6 deprived Native Americans of their
relationship to their land,37 culture and their own family norms.38
Beginning in colonial times, missionaries sought to "educate" Indian chil-
dren.39 In 1819, the federal government established the Civilization Fund that
provided grants to "private agencies, primarily churches, to establish programs
to 'civilize the Indian."' 4 0 By the late nineteenth century, the federal govern-
ment's official policy was to separate Native American children from their
tribes. As a result, the government and private agencies established boarding
schools to acculturate Native American children to Anglo-American language,
religion and other cultural norms.4 1 Federal practice also included placing
Native American children on farms in the East and Midwest to acquire Euro-
pean-American values.42 This generally coercive policy, designed to separate
children from their culture, tribes, and parents, by placing children in boarding
and day schools, continued into the mid-twentieth century.43 The next step in
this move to extinguish Native American culture began in 1959 when the
34 See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-law: An Historic and Contemporary View of
the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986) [hereinafter Strickland,
Genocide-at-law] (describing the cultural, though acknowledging the physical, genocide of
"the American Indian"); see also Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native
American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 325,
328 (1998) [hereinafter Strickland, Aboriginal Ghosts] (citing forced sterilization of Native
American women as recently as the 1980s).
35 See, e.g., Strickland, Genocide-at-law, supra note 34, at 721; Lacey, supra note 29. Pro-
fessor Daan Braveman argues that the Supreme Court has been most deferential to Indian
sovereignty when Native Americans were acting like Indians but less deferential when
Native Americans were behaving like dominant groups. Daan Braveman, Tribal Sover-
eignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REv. 75, 100-01 (2003).
36 This is not to say that this "conquest" was not violent and bloody. See, e.g., Strickland,
Genocide-at-law, supra note 34, at 734-35 (describing murders of Indians to obtain land).
37 Beside the removal of entire tribes from the lands on which they had lived to defined
reservations, the legal transformation of Indian lands from communally held to individually
owned parcels in an attempt to turn Native Americans into citizen farmers, shrunk Native
American land, autonomy, community and culture. Strickland, Genocide-at-law, supra note
34, at 724-26; Lacey, supra note 29, at 350-56.
38 For example, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Indian Courts and police
intervened into marital relations, gender roles, dress, hairstyles, rituals regarding death and
other passages, and even names. Atwood, supra note 28, at 587-89; Lacey, supra note 29, at
364-69; Strickland, Genocide-at-law, supra note 34, at 726, 728, 730.
39 Lacey, supra note 29, at 356-60.
40 H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 15 (1996).
41 Id.; Lacey, supra note 29, at 356-60, 363-64. "Many of these institutions housed more
than a thousand students ranging in age from three to thirteen." H.R. REP. No. 104-808 at
15. Nevada hosted the Stewart Indian School, "established in 1887 as a facility for Native
American education emphasizing self-reliance and cultural assimilation." Nevada Depart-
ment of Cultural Affairs, Division of Museums and History, http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/
museums/reno/expeople/eth800.htm, (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). This Indian child-saving
movement coincided with movements to save poor, immigrant children through orphan
trains, boarding schools, apprenticeships. See infra text accompanying notes 105 to 115.
42 H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 15.
43 H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 15-16; Lacey, supra note 29, at 359-61.
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Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Child Welfare League of America, the
standard-bearer for child welfare practice then and now, joined forces to create
the "Indian Adoption Project" which removed Indian children from their Indian
homes and placed them for adoption with non-Indian families.44 During the
1960s and 1970s, state social workers removed twenty-five to thirty-five per-
cent of Indian children from their homes to foster and adoptive homes and
more institutionalized settings. 45
It was because of this history that, in 1978, Congress finally acted to stem
the tide of removal of Native American children and passed the ICWA.4 6 The
ICWA created a somewhat unique and complex set of rights, both for the par-
ents and Indian custodians of Indian children 47 to heightened procedural and
substantive protections of their child-rearing role, and for the child and tribe to
maintain tribal integrity. The ICWA's purpose is to protect the best interests of
Indian children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and fami-
lies.48 Through the ICWA, Congress determined that, as a general matter, it is
in the best interests of Indian children to be protected from culturally-biased
intrusion into their family relations, for their welfare to be determined by inter-
ested tribes, and for their Indian ties to be preserved. 49 Specifically, in enacting
the ICWA, Congress found that "[b]lood relationship is the very touchstone of
a person's right to share in the cultural and property benefits of an Indian tribe"
and that, unlike an Indian adult, an "Indian child because of his minority, does
not have the capacity to make a reasoned decision about exercising his right to
enroll in his tribe." 5° These findings acknowledge both the close connection
41 H.R. REP. No. 104-808, at 16.
15 Hearings Before Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1974); H.R.
REP. No. 104-808, at 16.
46 Jeanne Louis Carriere suggests that romanticization of Native American culture in the
preceding decade played a role too. Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native Ameri-
can: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IowA L. REv. 585, 587-88
(1994). For a description of the legislative history of the ICWA, see id. at 601-610. In fact,
a Native American mother from Fallon, Nevada, Mrs. Townsend, testified in early hearings
regarding her family's experience with Nevada State Welfare Department the treatment of
her family. Problems That American Indian Families Face in Raising their Children and
How these Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction, 1974: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, 93d
Cong. 40-44 (1974) (statement of Margaret Townsend, Fallon Nevada).
47 The ICWA defines an Indian child as: "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000).
Thus Native American ancestry is not sufficient to bring a child into the ICWA's purview.
Congress found its authority for the ICWA in constitutional plenary power that grants Con-
gress authority over Indian tribes, members of tribes and those eligible for tribal enrollment.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 15-19 (1978).
48 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000). These twin purposes both acknowledge the interrelationship of
child, family and tribe and reclaim the "best interests of the child" standard from dominant
child welfare norms. See infra, notes 168 to 169 and accompanying text (discussing, inter
al., the best interests of the child standard).
49 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1915 (2000) (creating barriers to removal of Indian children
from their parents or Indian custodians, including permitting tribes to intervene in, or assert
jurisdiction over, foster care and adoption matters and prescribing placement with relatives
or other Native American families).
50 H.R. REP. No. 95-1386, at 20.
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between family relations and culture, and the autonomous, or adult, nature of
the decision to partake in that culture.
The ICWA contains, therefore, a number of provisions that protect parents
of Indian children from coercive state custodial intervention. When an Indian
child is the subject of foster care placement or termination of parental rights
proceedings, the parents must be provided with counsel.5 1 In removal and sub-
sequent foster care proceedings, the state must prove that the child is neglected
or abused by clear and convincing evidence, rather than the more common
preponderance of the evidence standard;52 in termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings, the state must prove the grounds to terminate parental rights by evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt.53 In both of these types of hearings, in
addition to any proof of parental unfitness, a decision to remove the child or
terminate parental rights must be supported by qualified expert testimony that
"continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."54 The state must
also apply "active" rather than "reasonable" efforts to provide remedial services
to the parents.5 Moreover, the child's tribe must be notified of the proceed-
ings and may intervene; the court must transfer the proceeding to the tribe's
court should it assert jurisdiction.5 6 Orders entered in violation of these afore-
mentioned provisions are subject to invalidation upon motion of the parents,
Indian custodian or tribe.57
The ICWA's provisions can, nevertheless, undermine the authority (right)
of a parent, or Indian custodian, of an Indian child to determine the best inter-
ests or placement of that child because the statute provides for placement
guidelines and tribal assertion of jurisdiction over the child in certain circum-
stances.5 8 The ICWA may, thus, limit the civil rights that parents of Indian
51 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2000). The court may appoint counsel for an Indian child when in
his or her best interests. Id.
52 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
53 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
54 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(e) & 1912(f). See also, Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: a Pro-
posal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 11
(1997) ("The Act does not specifically address whether testifying experts must be knowl-
edgeable in Indian cultures. However, most courts have inferred from section 1912 of the
Act that a qualified expert, in addition to being a domestic relations specialist, is one also
educated in Indian cultures.").
" Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) with 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000).
56 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c) & (b) (2000), respectively. Transfers of jurisdiction are subject to
the "good cause" exception and parental objection (§ 1911(b)) and good cause is also
grounds for departing from the ICWA's placement preferences. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) & (b)
(2000). There is also a judicially created exception to the ICWA, the "existing Indian fam-
ily" requirement that has been developed to avoid application of the ICWA to Indian chil-
dren. See infra., notes 144 to 160 and accompanying text.
57 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2000).
58 For example, when a child is domiciled, for purposes of the statute, on Indian land, the
tribe has exclusive jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43-53 (1989). Thus the parent of an Indian child cannot seek to
avoid tribal involvement with the placement of his or her child - including placement for
adoption. A parent of an Indian child not domiciled on the reservation may, however, veto
the assertion of tribal concurrent jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(b). A child over twelve
years old may also object. BIA Guidelines C.3(b)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67591 (1979).
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children would otherwise share with parents of non-Indian children. For exam-
ple, unlike non-Indian children whose parents may determine to place the child
without regard to the child's cultural or racial affinities, parents of Indian chil-
dren cannot alienate the Indian child from his or her tribal affiliation. 59 Simi-
larly, the ICWA's custodial hierarchy and the tribe can contravene parental
placement preferences.6" Yet the ICWA also offers higher protection for
parental rights in coercive and non-coercive intervention matters. For example,
parents of Indian children can revoke consent to foster care placement or a
relinquishment of parental rights anytime before an adoption is completed.61
No doubt, there are arguments on both sides regarding whether the ICWA
promotes parental civil rights. On balance, however, the ICWA provides sig-
nificant legal protections of the integrity of Indian families and cultures against
coercive state disruption. The ICWA does so in a context that respects Indian
families' distinct heritage while using liberal tools modified for non-individual-
istic cultural structures. Indeed, the ICWA reflects the cyclic connection
between children, parents, tribe, culture, and political survival.
II. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The ICWA recognizes that for most of their childhood, children lack the
capacity necessary for agency, but they have needs and interests that the law
can define and protect. Thus, the ICWA does not, for the most part, empower
children to exercise rights; instead the ICWA vests in the child's tribe, parents
and courts the power to promote children's interests.6 2 Similarly, more general
discourse regarding children's rights is as often about governmental determina-
59 See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 51 (noting that tribal jurisdiction was not meant to be defeated
by the actions of individual members of the tribe); See Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETmcs & PUB. POL'Y 543 (1996) (arguing that the ICWA deprives parents of their
rights). Moreover, even the ICWA's parental protections could seem restrictive of parental
liberties in some instances. For example, relinquishment of an Indian child for adoption,
unlike most other children, must occur in open court. 25 U.S.C. 1913(a) (2000); compare
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINOER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.11[6][c]-[I], 1 1[4][b] (1988)
(describing law and process regarding relinquishments and suggesting that they may be
made outside of court). Some parents may prefer relinquishing rights in a less formal and
more private setting.
60 25 USC § 1915 (2000).
61 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) & (c) (2000). Parents of non-Indian children are generally not
allowed to revoke relinquishment for adoption except under certain narrow conditions. See
NATIONAL ADOPTION INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, 2003 ADOPTION STATE STATUTE
SERIES STATUTES-AT-A-GLANCE: CONSENT TO ADOPTION 2 (May 31, 2003), http://naic.acf.
hhs.gov/generallegal/statutes/consent.pdf (last visited May 12, 2004) (generally, states do
not permit revocation of adoption consents, permit it only for cause, or limit the time for
revocation without cause).
62 Congress defined the interests of Indian children after five years of hearings regarding the
damage done to children, parents and tribes in the name of Indian children's best interests.
On Problems that American Indian Families Face in Raising Their Children and How these
Problems are Affected by Federal Action or Inaction, 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
On Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess.
40, 72-94 (1974); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 124 Before the U.S.




tions and the empowerment of adults to act on behalf of children as this dis-
course is about empowering children themselves.63 This variety in children's
rights discourse arises out of children's developmental progression which
requires adults to determine and execute children's rights and interests through-
out much of a child's minority. It may not be surprising then that "children's
rights" is a vague and capacious phrase the contents of which are so large and
varied that it is difficult to address systematically.64
Indeed, the ideas of "children" and "rights" are separately and together
extraordinarily complex and variable. Like all categories, "children" is contin-
gent, its meaning varying according to discipline, culture and time period, but
for legal purposes, the category generally refers to human beings from birth to
eighteen years old. 65 This definition very roughly corresponds to developmen-
tal literature that regards human beings during this age span as immature:
dependent on others for care, education, affection, and basic physical needs;
lacking cognitive capacity to make sound decisions and exercise reasoned judg-
ment; and highly vulnerable to influence from others.66 The late adolescent
years are most complex developmentally and legally.6 7 Moral and political
philosophers have only recently turned their direct attention to the status of
children, although as in the law, Western philosophers have long viewed chil-
dren as undeveloped adults or the property, or extensions, of their parents.68
Like "child," "rights" has various meanings within and across disci-
plines.69 In the context of children, "rights" refers to positive and negative
legal claims or forbearance,7 ° procedural protections,7 1 interpretative tools,72
63 Appell, supra note 1, at 715.
6 Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Looking Back, Looking Ahead: The Evolution of
Children's Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1995). This statement may also be made
of the concept of rights in general. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rights in the Postmodern Condi-
tion, in LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 263, 263-304 (Aus-
tin Sarat & Thomas K.Kearns, eds., 1997) (noting that "'rights' defy easy identification").
65 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547,
559 (2000). Children younger than eighteen who commit crimes may be deemed adults for
purposes of criminal prosecution and punishment. Id. at 557.
66 Id. at 550-51.
67 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 65 (reviewing differing laws regarding voting, consent to
medical treatment and abortion, and juvenile justice and describing adolescent decision-mak-
ing that is unduly influenced by peers and under appreciates risk and time).
68 David Archard & Colin M. Macleod, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 1
(2002). See generally, TiH MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN, supra; Harry
Brighouse, How Should Children be Heard?, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 691 (2003); Tamar Schapiro,
Childhood and Personhood, 45 ARiz. L. REv. 575 (2003).
69 Again Pierre Schlag captures the multiple meanings and functions of "rights" in general
in America, including serving as legal claims, forbearance, political claims, and, primarily,
as the subject of normative debate. Supra note 64, at 263-67.
70 For example, substantive due process, equal protection, right to recover in tort, right to
benefits, right to protection under criminal and child protective laws, etc. See generally ROB-
ERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS & REMEDIES (2002).
71 E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to due process); FED. R. CIv. P. 17 (Foundation
Press 2002) (discussing party status); FELLMETH, supra note 70, at 33-35.
72 E.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. REV.
1860, 1876 (1987) ("Rights in this sense are not 'trumps,' but the language we use to try to
persuade others to let us win this round. When advocates for children ask a court to recog-
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rhetorical devices,73 needs,74 legal interests,75 and voice,76 to name a few.
Indeed, "children's rights" is used extraordinarily loosely and broadly.7 7 The
notion of children as rights holders is further complicated by the close tie
between autonomy or agency and rights. Although most lawyers and philoso-
phers probably would agree that it makes sense to talk about children's rights
as protection of their needs or promotion of their welfare,78 there is less agree-
ment regarding whether children have, or should have, associational, expres-
sive, or religious freedom. Those freedoms, as applied to children, are more
controversial because of children's emotional and cognitive limitations and the
political implications of treating children as autonomous decision-makers.
Notwithstanding the complexity of, and barriers to, children as rights hold-
ers, many children's rights advocates view children as another oppressed group
that must be free from adult (often parental) control that does not serve chil-
dren's interests or take sufficient account of children's wishes.7 9 That is,
scholars and politicians evoke or promote children's rights as vehicles to pro-
tect children's interests in autonomy (particularly when older),8° in certain
nize children's rights to privacy, due process, or other protections, they seek judicial state-
ment that will articulate new boundaries and connections between children and adults.").
73 E.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1247, 1257-57 (1999); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child Cen-
tered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1747, 1841-42 (1993).
7 See Esperanza Ochafta & M. Angeles Espinosa, Needs of Children and Adolescents as a
Basis for the Justification of Their Rights, 9 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 313 (2001) (suggesting that
children's rights be conceived as what is needed for their physical health and autonomy,
according to a child's developmental level).
75 Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399 (1996); Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children, Recommendations of the Conference, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1301 (1996).
76 E.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspec-
tives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11 (1994); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to
Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571
(1996).
77 It is then perhaps not surprising that much of the call of children's rights has come from
lawyers (including law professors), social workers and politicians, but not philosophers. See
Brighouse, supra note 68, at 692 (noting that in the United Kingdom education and social
work professionals and academics have supported children's rights, but the movement has
found little support among philosophers).
78 E.g., Brighouse, supra note 68; Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights and Children's Lives,
98 ETHICS 445 (1988); but see James Griffin, Do Children Have Rights?, in THE MORAL
AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 19, 24-27 (Archard & Macleod eds., 2002) (arguing
that infants have needs, not rights).
79 E.g., Catherine A. Crosby-Currie & N. Dickon Reppucci, The Missing Child in Child
Protection: The Constitutional Context of Child Maltreatment from Meyer to DeShaney, 21
L. & POL'Y 129 (1999); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Per-
spective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995); Barbara Bennett Wood-
house, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 995 (1992).
80 Griffin, supra note 78; Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to
Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223 (1999); see also Richard Arneson & Ian
Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder,




associations, 8 1 and in basic physical health and safety.8 2 For purposes of this
paper, I do not address the difference between rights and interests, positive and
negative rights, or agency and welfare rights.8 3 Instead, I use "rights" to
encompass both rights children can press affirmatively themselves, or through a
next friend or guardian ad litem, and those interests of children that laws
protect.
Calls for children's rights in both of these senses often fail to take into
account the different contexts for the children's rights they press. That is, some
children's rights are conceptually, and historically, within civil rights move-
ments that protect members of non-dominant groups (e.g., racial and sexual
minorities and women) from state interference with the right to be full persons,
that is, to be autonomous beings in the moral and legal sense. These rights
include the freedom to vote, control reproduction, rear children, dissent, and
otherwise be arbiters of one's own values. Other children's rights arise out of
state intervention into private realms. These rights, contrary to those based in
civil rights, exist because of children's dependency and are not designed to
promote independence or autonomy during minority, although the long-term
goal for children is that they will become free-thinking adults.84 These latter
rights are what I term dependency rights; the former, I term quasi-civil rights.
They are "quasi-civil rights" because most of them do not extend to children in
the same way or with the same breadth as they do to adults, but are still rights
that relate to curbing state interference with liberty.85
The distinction between these two rights categories reflects both the differ-
ence between rights applied to children despite their minority and rights
applied because of their minority and the difference in origin; the quasi-civil
rights arising out of civil rights movements, or at least constitutional amend-
ments, and the dependency rights arising from an older, less liberatory tradi-
tion. I explain the different origins and natures of these two categories of
children's rights next and then return to the ICWA in Section III to illustrate
how dependency rights diverge from civil and quasi-civil rights.
81 E.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 76, at 102-05; Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The
Constitutional Rights of Children To Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals,
53 MD. L. REv. 358, 362, 395 (1994); Suellyn Scamecchia, A Child's Right to Protection
from Transfer Trauma in a Contested Adoption Case, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 52-
56 (1995).
82 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
83 See Brighouse, supra note 68, at 696-701 (distinguishing between rights and interests and
identifying welfare rights - those pertaining to well-being, e.g., food, shelter, healthcare, -
and agency rights - the right to act on one's own judgment, e.g., to choose medical treat-
ment, religion); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 864 (1986) (exploring negative and positive constitutional rights).
84 Appell, supra note 1, at 707-09, 717 n. 47.
85 Children have other types of rights, for example, to sue in tort, own property, enter into
contracts. Similarly, children have certain enhanced rights, such as the right to renounce




Although constitutional law has continued to view children as embedded
in families, children have, particularly as they mature, gained certain rights
against unwarranted state intrusion into physical and moral liberty. These
rights follow those of adults but are extended only partially, or differently, to
children because of their minority status. These rights recognize children as
persons under the Constitution and extend due process and equal protection of
the law to them, but in limited, or even special, ways because of their minority.
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the United States
Supreme Court recognized children as "persons" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment entitled to equal protection and procedural due process. Considered the
beginning of the modem children's rights movement,86 in 1954, Brown v.
Board of Education, acknowledged that Black children have a right to equal
protection of the laws.87 The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) brought the case as part of its mission to promote
social and economic justice and to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson. 88 After
Brown, the Supreme Court continued to apply the equal protection doctrine to
children, ruling that the state should treat children alike, despite their race,
national origin, or the marital status of their parents. For example, in a series of
cases involving denial of benefits to non-marital children, the Supreme Court
extended to "illegitimate" children the status of "persons" within the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause.89 The Court next extended the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to immigrant children.90
The Supreme Court has also applied the Due Process Clause to children.
In In re Gault, another milestone for children's civil rights, the Court famously
stated "neither the Fourteenth Amendments nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."'" Thus, the Court held that children in delinquency proceedings have a
right to procedural due process, including the right to a lawyer when a child's
physical liberty is at stake.9 2 The Court did not, however, grant the same con-
stitutional rights to children in delinquency proceedings that adult defendants
86 Glennon & Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1559-60; David Tanenhaus, Between Dependency
and Liberty: The Conundrum of Children's Rights in the Gilded Age, 23 LAW & HISTORY
REV. (2005) (forthcoming) (note 3 in draft). Professor Tanenhaus contests that Brown was
the first children's rights case. See infra note 92.
87 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVO-
CACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7-8 (1996) (noting that the desegregation cases
were part of the NAACP's twenty year effort to dismantle Plessy and to change public
policy).
89 E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411
U.S. 619 (1973).
90 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
91 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
92 Id. at 41. Tanenhaus, supra note 86, relates an even earlier due process case in Illinois
nearly 100 years before Gault. That case, brought just after passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, makes comparisons between children's civil rights and civil rights for people of color.
Id. Tanenhaus considers the case, People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870), to be "the first
modem children's rights case." Tanenhaus, supra note 86.
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receive in criminal proceedings.9 3 Subsequently, the Court applied the Due
Process Clause to children subject to school discipline.94 In fact, the first case
to do so, Goss v. Lopez, arose out of the Civil Rights Movement. 95 Lopez and
the other plaintiffs challenging the school district's actions were Black students
disciplined for protesting against racial discrimination at three Columbus, Ohio
high schools during a time (1971) of overt racial strife.96 Also in 1971, in
response to the draft for the Vietnam War, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was
ratified, giving eighteen to twenty year-olds the right to vote.97
In addition, the Court has recognized limited autonomy-based freedoms
against state intrusion into children's lives in such areas as speech and repro-
ductive control. For example, in 1969, the Court upheld the right of students to
protest the Vietnam War by wearing black arm bands against a school regula-
tion banning such expression.98 The Court subsequently granted minors lim-
ited rights to reproductive choice in a series of cases arising out of the women's
rights movement.99 In a challenge brought by adults and organizations on
behalf of themselves and minors, the Supreme Court struck down a ban on
93 Indeed, the Court has granted additional, but not co-extensive with adults, due process
protections in juvenile delinquency matters. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double
jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt).
94 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding deprivation hearings post imposi-
tion of corporal punishment sufficient under due process clauses, but declining to require
pre-deprivation hearings or apply the Eighth Amendment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 585
(1975) (finding liberty and property interest in education requiring minimal pre-deprivation
hearings in school suspensions).
15 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 585 (1975). See Franklin E. Zimring & Rayman L. Solomon,
Goss v. Lopez: The Principle of the Thing, in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF
CMLDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 449 (1996) (describing the civil
rights and racial dimensions of the events leading up to the Goss v. Lopez litigation).
Although the local NAACP was instrumental in beginning and framing the lawsuit, involve-
ment of the national students rights community drove and characterized the case as a "'stu-
dent rights' not a 'racial rights"' case. Zimring & Solomon, supra, at 470-71. Still, the
plaintiffs' lawyer recognized, though underplayed, the fact that poor and Black students were
disproportionately subject to punitive discipline. Id. at 472. Thus what began as a civil
ights case was recast as a children's ights case - a matter about children without regard to
race, gender, or class.
96 Id. at 459-466.
17 Scott, supra note 65, at 563-64.
98 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); but see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (upholding prohibitions against selling sexually explicit magazines to minors).
Twenty-three years before Tinker, the Supreme Court struck down state requirements that
school children salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, but that case was brought
by parents on behalf of themselves and their children. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 627 (1943), aff'g 47 F. Supp. 251 (D.C. Va. 1942); see also Vincent Blais &
Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The
Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433-
475 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004) (describing circumstances of, and leading up to, Barnette,
including the children's refusal to salute the flag). The Court also sustained a child's First
Amendment challenge to school board's removal of books from school library. Bd. of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
99 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (right to seek judicial, rather than parental,
consent to abortion); Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to contra-
ception); see also Robert H. Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird: A Hard Case, in ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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distribution of non-prescription contraceptives to children under sixteen years
of age."° Two years later, the Court held that the state cannot require a preg-
nant girl under the age of eighteen to involve her parents in her decision to have
an abortion; instead, there must be procedures available to her for obtaining
judicial consent.' 1 Because abortion is a medical procedure, over which par-
ents normally have control, these cases afford young women some freedom
from parental and state interference with intimate, life-altering decisions
regarding reproduction. 1
0 2
These children's rights, or quasi-civil rights, are similar to adult civil
rights in that they protect children from unfair, arbitrary, punitive and intrusive
state action. Quasi-civil rights arose out of movements designed to resist coer-
cive or forbearing state action that interferes with the power of individuals to
define themselves or their children. These rights resist state action and chal-
lenge the status quo. Their extension to children is mediated by children's
developmental status and their position as dependents in a liberal democracy.
B. Dependency Rights
This category of rights is older than the quasi-civil rights category - pre-
dating the Constitution. In addition, dependency rights belong to, or are devel-
oped on behalf of, children because they are dependent and therefore more
vulnerable; they need assistance, not freedom, from the state. These rights also
relate to children's unique situation in families and as future citizens. Depen-
dency rights reflect the mutual relationship between parent and state regarding
children in a liberal democracy, an interdependence in which the state assigns
the obligation and freedom of rearing children - feeding, protecting, nurturing,
teaching and inculcating values - to the parents, while the state oversees and
checks this process by ensuring that parents are meeting children's basic needs
and that children receive the basic tools to become democratic citizens. 113 This
parent-child-state relationship is thus marked by social development and con-
trol: parental control of children and state control of parents and of "parentless"
children.
Unlike quasi-civil rights, which curb state action and are patterned after
adult rights, dependency rights invite state action and are unique to children
because of children's special vulnerability. These laws consist of: provisions
for the protection of children; material benefits such as medical insurance; food
and cash subsidies; and educational benefits. These rights do not always
belong to the child but are designed to inure to children certain benefits through
their parents, custodians, or the state. The history and nature of dependency
149-264 (1996) (describing the Bellotti case and the circumstances surrounding its
litigation).
l00 Carey, 431 U.S. at 691-99.
101 Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (a pregnant minor, "Mary Moe," was one of the plaintiffs).
102 See Jennifer Durcan & Annette R. Appell, Minor Birth Mothers and Consent to Adop-
tion: An Anomaly in Youth Law, 5(1) ADOPTION Q. 69 (2001) (discussing adolescents' rights
to consent to adoption, abortion and other medical and mental health treatment); Martin
Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 589
(2002) (exploring the limitations to minors' abortion rights).
103 This is an admittedly schematic and overly simplified version that does not address
present or historic material, legal and social limitations to full participation in society.
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rights, which both define and arise out of a child's minority, reveal that they are
limited and marked by control rather than freedom.
The idea that children have needs that adults are obliged to meet, predates
contemporary notions of children's rights."° Even in the colonial period, free
children had the legal right to defend themselves against parental abuse and
children could be removed from parents who failed to protect the child's inter-
ests, safety or morals. 10 5 Orphans' courts and other state entities provided pro-
tections of orphaned children's interests, including their property, if any, and of
their right to be free from abuse. 10 6 These protections were designed to place
children in situations that would ensure they would not become, or remain,
public charges; thus, children were bound out to work for families or placed in
orphanages where they were taught Christian morals and industry.' 0 7 Eventu-
ally some authorities established reformatories and other homes for dependent
and disorderly children both to protect and educate children without adequate
parental supervision and to protect the public from these children.10 8 These
"protections" were enjoyed primarily by free children with the lowest socioeco-
nomic resources. 09
By the middle of the nineteenth century, free children were increasingly
viewed as separable and separate from their families of origin." ° In 1851,
Massachusetts passed the first general adoption statute enabling adults to adopt
children by petitioning a court and showing, among other things, that the adop-
tion would be good for the child; by the end of the century, nearly every state
had enacted such a law."' In addition, a new and growing child protection
movement aimed to provide better lives for neglected, abused and otherwise
'04 Tanenhaus, supra note 86.
105 JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY
AND PROTECTION 1-7 (1991); MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHIL-
DREN'S RIGHTS 7-12 (1994). Joseph Hawes claims that these early laws, the basis for later
more elaborate child protection provisions, were the first "anywhere in the world to offer
legal protection of any kind to children .... HAWES, supra, at 5. Mary Ann Mason pro-
vides a less positive account of children's status and legal treatment in colonial times, supra,
at 1-47, but she does describe the role of courts in resolving disputes about free children and,
eventually, of indentured children. MASON, supra, at 1-13. Mason notes that colonial fam-
ily and indenture laws were inherited from England, but "the unique experience of slavery
created custodial arrangements for children that were unknown to common law." Id. at 3.
106 HAWES, supra note 105, at 7-8. Slave laws governed the care and custody of child
slaves. ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM 23
(1972).
'07 See HAWES, supra note 105, at 7-9 (describing protections of orphans and noting that
such devices were designed to protect the public fisc and promote social order); MASON,
supra note 105, at 4, 7 (noting that courts could remove children from fathers for failing to
prepare children for work and or provide economic support); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 39-45 (describing similar attempts to protect Native American children's moral
development).
108 BILLINGSLEY & GIOVANNONI, supra note 106, at 22-23; HAWES, supra note 105, at 16-
25.
109 Appell, supra note 1, at 771-72.
110 Of course, slavery had for centuries treated enslaved children as separable from their
families by failing to accord legal protection to the parent-child relationship.
1"1 See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American. Law of Adoption,
11 J. FAM. L. 443, 465 (1971) (summarizing the early history of adoption).
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dependent children. Although some child advocates sought to provide assis-
tance to children within their families, much of the advocacy movement pro-
tected children by removing them from their families and communities and
placing them in institutions, as apprentices or with other families, often hun-
dreds of miles away from their homes."' 2 Protecting children generally meant
socializing them into white, middle-class protestant values and work ethic.113
The children protected were primarily from immigrant and working class fami-
lies114 or Native American tribes,' 15 although free Black children were also
targeted and indentured or housed in segregated orphanages.' 16 Protecting
children did not include protecting enslaved or newly freed children. Indeed,
the nineteenth century child protection movement barely registered the needs of
Black children in the North and did not respond to the extraordinary poverty
and other challenges facing newly emancipated child slaves in the South.117
The child protection movement eventually transformed itself into the mod-
em child welfare (foster care) system which continues to remove children from
poor, abusive, or neglectful parents and places them with licenced foster care
families.1'8 As an outgrowth of the developing social work and psychology
professions, in 1899, Cook County, Illinois established the first juvenile court,
itself an institution protecting children from the hardships of the adult world
while protecting children's and their parents' rights.'1 9 Within twenty years,
all but three states followed. 2 o In this context, and through the eyes of profes-
sionals, children were particularly salvageable and malleable. 12 ' No longer
was biology (with the exception of "race") the sole determinant of potential;
instead, social science viewed children's needs, mental health and development
as both measurable and dependent upon parental conduct, which was also mea-
112 DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 13-14 (2d ed., 2004). LINDA GORDON,
THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION (1999). Hawes, supra note 105, at 17-24.
113 This is not meant to minimize the dire circumstances of dependent (and often orphaned)
children prior to the child protection movement. These children lived on the streets or in
alms houses, where they were not segregated from adults. LINDSEY, supra note 112, at 12.
There were attempts to bolster families, however. During the Progressive Era, mother's
pensions were created to help worthy poor mothers raise their children. Id. at 21-22; DAVID
TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 58-67 (2004). Federal programs such as Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its successor Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) replaced these benefits. LINDSEY, supra note 112, at 22-23.
114 GORDON, supra note 112, at 8-13.
115 Supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
116 BILLINGSLEY & GIOVANINNI, supra note 106, at 27-30.
117 Id., at 38-41.
118 Appell, supra note 1, at 771-73; see also LINDSEY, supra note 112, at 11-24 (describing
transformation); MASON, supra note 105, at 101-11 (describing early removal of children
from their mothers due to poverty and immorality).
119 For a history of this court, see TANENHAUS, supra note 113.
120 Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the Juvenile Court, 49 Juv.
& FAm. CT. J. 17, 26 (1998). These juvenile courts provided and still provide adjudicatory
forums regarding children in need of supervision, rehabilitation, care, or protection. Id.
121 HAWES, supra note 105, at 26-32. Hawes also ties this development to the eventual
regulation and prohibition of child labor. Id. at 40 ("Only after working-class and immigrant




surable. 12 2 In the first half of the 20th century and as part of the New Deal,
child protection grew increasingly professionalized and the Federal government
became a major player in protection of dependent children. 123 These protec-
tions included the establishment of the social security system providing benefits
to mothers with dependent children and eventually the foster care system.
124
Various benefits for dependent children were aimed at preventing juvenile
delinquency and promoting "suitable" homes for children. 1
25
By the 1950s, the modem child welfare system "began to emerge as a
major public institution, with child welfare agencies becoming professional
state agencies ...separate from the public welfare agencies, a circumstance
that added to the popular support and professional prestige of the child welfare
system." 126 In the 1960s, physicians identified and described the "battered
child syndrome" and advocated the reporting of child abuse to authorities.
1 27
In the next decade, professionals coined another new phrase, "psychological
parent" which defined "parent" according to a particular theory that privileged
conscious psychological ties between children and parental figures, nuclear
family forms and subjective, time-limited assessments. 1 28 These developments
drove a wedge between children's and parents' rights and interests and pro-
vided "scientific" rationale and guidelines for the contemporary child welfare
system. 129
This child welfare system is based on a series of federal statutes and fund-
ing guidelines for states that prescribe certain protective, foster care and adop-
tion services for children and require judicial oversight of abused and neglected
children.' 3 ° In this system, every child subject to child welfare proceedings
must be represented by a guardian ad litem."3t This mandate created a demand
for attorneys for children and led to additional professionalization of the sys-
tem. 132 To further protect children, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance
122 See HAWES, supra note 105, at 54-55, 58-59, 61-63.
123 Id. at 66-79.
124 Appell, supra note 1, at 771-73.
125 HAWES, supra note 105, at 75, 80-85, 89-91.
126 LINDSEY, supra note 112, at 23.
127 In the 1960s, physicians identified the "battered child syndrome." HAWES supra note
105, at 99-100.
128 Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347, 347-48, 350-54 (1996).
129 HAWES, supra note 105, at 99-105; see also Bette L. Bottoms, Margaret Bull Kovera, &
Bradley D. McAuliff, Children, Social Science, and the Law: An Introduction to the Issues,
in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 1 (Bette L. Bottoms, et al., eds., 2002) ('there
are few other areas of law where the courts rely as heavily on social science data as they do
for decisions about children's welfare"'); LINDSEY, supra note 112, at 29-40 (describing
early social science research that helped form the framework for the contemporary child
welfare system).
130 Glennon & Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1560.
131 Child Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)
(2000).
132 Ann M. Haralambie & Kari L. Nysee-Carris, Children's Legal Representation in Civil
Litigation, in CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 106, 109 (Bette L. Bottoms, et al.,
eds., 2002) (discussing attorney representation of children under CAPTA). By the 1980s,
"pediatric law began to form as a distinct subspecialty within the law." Id. at 110; see also
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and Child Welfare Act (CWA) 13 3 designed to provide supportive services to
families at risk of abusing or neglecting their children, foster care payments to
the states, procedural protections for families and children including judicial
oversight, and subsidies for adoption of certain foster children. Before the
CWA, the child welfare system did not have procedural or administrative
checks on the use of funds or service provision for children; the result was
"foster care drift," a system in which children were moved from placement to
placement, lost contact with their families, were not adopted and often did not
receive basic medical care. 
134
In 1997, as a result of the CWA's reputation for being overly protective of
parents and insufficiently attentive to children's interests, Congress amended
the CWA to promote adoption of children. 135 These amendments limit family
reunification efforts and establish a presumption that parental rights should be
terminated after children have been in care for fourteen months.' 3 6 Congress
also passed the Interethnic Placement Act, designed to promote trans-racial
adoption by forbidding the consideration of race in the placement of children
for adoption and creating a private cause of action for adoptive parents or chil-
dren when the state has denied placement based on race.
1 37
Children's dependency rights thus arise out of a history of protection and
social control of non-dominant children and families along with a developing
vision of children as dependent but separate and separable from their families
and communities of origin. Accompanying these two foundational themes of
dependency rights is a View that children have a right to a certain kind of envi-
ronment or family life and that state actors, rather than parents, can discern
with scientific and legal certainty which environment or family is best for the
child. In this way, dependency rights are contrary to adult civil rights relating
to child-rearing because dependency rights are so closely tied to social control
and definition of children, parents and families. It is also difficult to identify
children's dependency rights as quasi-civil rights because the former define
children's interests rather than free children to decide those interests for them-
Bruce Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996).
131 Public Law 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
134 MaryLee Allen, Carol Golubock, & Lynn Olson, A Guide to the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN AND THE COURTS 575, 576-86 (Mark
Hardin, ed., 1983).
1' CONG. REc. H10776-04, H10782 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
136 Adoption Assistance and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-189, 111
Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)). For critiques of
ASFA, see, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do about It: Is
the Problem That Too Many Children Are Not Being Adopted out of Foster Care or That
Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141 (1999); Dorothy
Roberts, Is There Justice In Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preserva-
tion Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999).
"I Section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§1808, 110 Stat. 1755, 1903-04 (1996); codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 674, & 1996b (2000).
At about the same time, Congress also reformed its welfare system for families with depen-
dent children, limiting the nature and amount of government benefits poor families with
dependent children can receive. Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Chil-
dren, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 459-61 (2004).
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selves. In other words, these dependency rights serve children by granting
authority to parents or state actors - e.g., judges, social workers, and attorneys
- to make decisions for and about children.
III. DEPENDENCY & CIVIL RIGHTS: THE ICWA
The contradiction between civil and dependency rights is illustrated in the
implementation of the ICWA.' 38 The civil rights aspects of the ICWA,
explored above, provide added barriers to protective, i.e., dependency-based,
intervention into Indian families in order to counter-balance culturally-biased
destruction of Native American families and to preserve the cultural and politi-
cal existence of Indian tribes. The ICWA's dependency rights, intended to pro-
tect children from unwarranted state intervention, address substantive and
procedural aspects of decision-making regarding who will rear Indian children
in need of governmental protection. These protections are designed to counter
the dominance of white middle class culture in protective custody proceedings
relating to Indian children. 13 9 In other words, the ICWA's aim was to counter
the regressive aspects of dependency rights by providing additional civil rights
to parents of Indian children and their tribes in dependency matters.
The core of the ICWA's dependency rights revolves around children's
entitlement to have their Native American culture preserved - to privilege their
Indian blood ties, even when their parents, judges, social workers, and others
have different ideas about what is best for the child.14 ° When placement is
necessary, children have the right for the decision-maker to place them with
members of their extended family, other members of the child's tribe, or with
persons from another tribe, in that order of preference.' 4 ' Moreover, under the
ICWA, an Indian child has the right to have his or her tribe provide input into
custodial decisions through intervention or assumption of jurisdiction, should
the tribe so choose. The child also has a right to appointed counsel should the
court find, in its discretion, that such appointment would be in the best interests
of the child. 142
Reported litigation under the ICWA reveals the persistence of dominant
culture hegemony and the vulnerability of dependency-based rights to social
control, because what is done in the name of children's interests is related to
adult visions of where children belong and what is best for the specific child
138 Indeed, the ICWA itself could be said to arise out of the unique dependent status of
Indian tribes in the U.S. The ICWA's Congressional findings acknowledge this connection:
"Congress ... has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian
tribes and their resources." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2) (2000). 'thus, the ICWA would appear to
embrace especially multi-layered connections between dependency and civil rights.
139 Native Americans perceived state child welfare systems as applying standards that were
unrelated to the child's welfare. Carriere, supra note 46, at 602 (citing the early ICWA
hearings).
1o The ICWA's civil rights core relates to the preservation of tribes and added protection of
parental rights. In the text, above and following this note, I discuss the ICWA's dependency
rights.
141 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000).
142 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2000).
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subject of the litigation.' 43 Given the adult, value-based nature of dependency
rights, it is not surprising that state courts have developed exceptions to the
application of the ICWA. These exceptions include the judicially-created
"existing Indian family exception" and the inclusion of the child's "best inter-
ests" as "good cause" not to transfer Indian child welfare cases to the tribe.
These judicially-created doctrines reveal the tenacity of cultural hegemony in
dependency rights even when applying a statute designed to counter that
hegemony.
The existing Indian family exception holds that the ICWA does not apply
when the Indian child has been removed from a family that is not engaged in
Native American cultural life, 1" despite the ICWA's statutory definition of an
Indian child as one who is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe; or (b) is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a mem-
ber of an Indian tribe.' 45 The existing Indian family exception disregards the
tribe's determination of who is an Indian child and permits Anglo-American
courts to define "Indian" and "family." Thus an Indian father who is single or
is living with a non-Indian mother is not an Indian family,' 4 6 and an Indian
couple not living on a reservation or involved with their tribe is not an Indian
family. 14 7 The existing Indian family exception operates to avoid the applica-
tion of the ICWA altogether. This existing Indian family exception is thus
stunningly ironic in that it removes the power to define Indian children and
Indian families from the tribe (as the ICWA contemplates) and awards it to
non-tribal, non-Indian decision-makers. The exception thus thwarts the primary
goal of, and reason for, the ICWA. 1 48
143 Jeanne Louise Carriere describes implementation of the ICWA as reflecting "the limits
on dominant culture's willingness to abandon its own representation of the subordinate cul-
ture and its control over it." Carriere, supra note 46, at 590.
14 Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kansas 1982), was the first case to establish
such an exception. Other courts have followed. E.g., S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So.2d 1187 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1990); Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988); Kentucky Rye v. Wea-
sel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996); Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So.2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995);
S.A.M. 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo .App. 1986); Baby Girl S., 690 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. 1999);
Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992);
Morgan, 1997 WL 716880 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash.
1992); Santos Y, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also Toni Hahn Davis, The
Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D.L. REV. 465
(1993). Many states have rejected the exception. See e.g., In re Adoption of T.N.F. 781
P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989); Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960 (Ariz. App. 2000);
Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993); Adoption of S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995);
Elliott, 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. App. 1996); Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. App.
2000); Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); Adoption of
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993 (Utah App. 1997).
145 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000).
146 Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
147 Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), overruled by CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 360.6 (1999), statute found unconstitutional by Santos Y, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
148 The exception also removes the power to define oneself as an Indian. See Kevin Noble
Maillard, Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-
Racial Adoption, 28 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 107, 124-139 (2003/2004) (exploring how courts,
using majoritarian, essentialist notions of Indianness, determine whether a parent is suffi-
ciently Indian to make the child an "Indian child" for purposes of the ICWA).
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The highly publicized California case involving the Rost twins 49 illus-
trates the tensions between civil rights and dependency rights, and the tenacity
with which dependency rights reinforce dominant culture rather than promote
autonomous (in the moral sense) decision-making. The Rost twins were, under
the ICWA, "Indian children," who were not born on a reservation. °50 Their
married parents, Richard and Cindy, were young, poor and already raising two
sons when Cindy, a Mexican Yaqui Indian, became pregnant with the twins.' 51
Cindy was living in a shelter with their two children when she and Richard, a
Dry Creek Rancheria Pomo Indian, decided to contact an adoption attorney
because they did not have the means to raise two more children.1 52 Within
three days of the twins' birth, Cindy and Richard executed relinquishments of
the twins for adoption to an agency for placement with the Rosts, a non-Indian
Midwestern couple. Three days later, the twins were living with the Rosts in
Ohio. 
15 3
The ICWA's requirement that such relinquishments only be given in court
was not followed because the adoption attorney advised Richard that disclosure
of his Indian heritage would delay the adoption.' 54 Richard told his mother
about the birth and relinquishment after the fact. She in turn, about a month
after the twins were born, notified the tribe and they developed an alternative
care plan to place the twins with Richard's sister who would rear them.' 55
When the twins were about six months old, their tribe sought to intervene in the
proceedings and, with their father, to invalidate the relinquishments under the
ICWA; the court obliged, denied the prospective adoptive parents' petition to
terminate the twins' parents' parental rights and ordered the twins placed with
their paternal grandparents. 156
The California Court of Appeal, which had stayed the trial court's order to
place the twins with their kin, held that if the children's parent or parents had
maintained "significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe"
then the ICWA would apply."' If the parents did not have such a relationship,
then substantive due process and equal protection doctrines precluded applica-
149 Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507.
150 Id. at 516-17.
151 Id. The ICWA does not appear to apply to children who are descended from Indian
tribes outside the United States borders. T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (I11. App. 1991),
appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 22 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 880 (1992).
152 Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517. At this time, their other two children were only one-
and two-years-old respectively. Beside the financial hardship of raising four children, the
prospect of caring for four children age three and under must have been daunting.
153 Id. at 517-18. The Rosts had paid $14,000 for attorneys fees and the birth mother's
expenses to the adoption attorney whom the twins' parents had approached when they real-
ized they would not be able to care for the twins. Id. at 517.
"I See id. at 517 (noting that Richard identified himself on the relinquishment form as
Native American, but "when told the adoptions would be delayed or prevented if Richard's
Indian ancestry were known, Richard filled in a revised form, omitting the information that
he was Indian").
155 Id. at 518.
156 Id. at 514. The Rosts obtained a stay of the court's order pending appeal. Id.
157 Id. at 530, remanding the case to the trial court for such determination.
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tion of the ICWA to these children. 158 As a result of this decision, California
amended its dependency statute in 1999 to overrule the existing Indian family
exception, stating, inter alia, that:
A determination by an Indian tribe that [a child] is either (1) a member of an Indian
tribe or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and a biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe shall constitute a significant political affiliation with the
tribe and shall require the application of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to the
proceedings. 159
This explicit recognition of the political content and context of the parent-
child relationship did not survive the California courts. In 2001, the California
Court of Appeal held that the state statute, and the ICWA, as applied to a child
who was not removed from an existing Indian family, were unconstitutional.
160
Ultimately, the Rosts did adopt the twins after the adults, including their
paternal grandmother and the tribe, agreed to settle the case. 161 The settlement
provided that the Pomo Tribe and the parents would forego their rights and
permit the Rosts to adopt the twins in exchange for yearly family visits after
adoption, an agreement that may be unenforceable under Ohio law.1 62 At the
time of the settlement, the twins' parents, who were still together and raising
the older siblings, were deeply pained; for Ms. Rost, the settlement was a
gift. 163 Nearly three years earlier, Ms. Rost had written to her U.S. Representa-
tive begging assistance to keep the twins from going "back to a pathological
family situation. ' ' "6 These divergent interests and Ms. Rosts' negative opinion
of the twins' family could have prevented such a settlement and could yet inter-
fere with ongoing execution of the potentially unenforceable settlement.
State courts have developed another method to privilege dominant norms
and circumvent the ICWA's attempts to restore power to Native Americans to
158 Id. at 516 (applying the 5th, 10th & 14th Amendments). The court's opinion opens with
the well-worn assertion that "children are not merely chattels belonging to their parents." Id.
at 507. This statement, typically evoked in custody contexts by those who side with the
physical, non parental, custodian who claims that the child should remain with the person
who had custody the longest, is ironic. This view of a child's "best interests" evokes the
property doctrine of adverse possession. Moreover, the devaluation of a child's birth and
cultural ties is recognized by some adoption scholars as a method of commodifying children.
RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS 26 (2001); Barbara Yngvesson, Placing the
"Gift Child" in Transnational Adoption, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 227, 239 (2002).
159 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 360.6(c) (West 1999) (emphasis added). See In re Santos
Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 723 (2002) (noting that section 360.6 was enacted as a legislative
response to the Bridget R. appellate court ruling).
16 Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 723-31 (Cal. App. 2001), review denied, 2002.
161 Randall Edwards, Rosts Celebrate Their Twin Win, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 8,
1998, 1998 WL 16500243.
162 Id.
163 K. Connie Kang, As Adoption Fight Ends, 2 Families of Twins Meet Reconciliation:
Adoptive and Birth Parents Share Pizza and Watch the Children Play. Settlement is
Expected to be Finalized Monday, L.A. TIMEs, at BI, 1997 WL 14007625. The reporter
describes the birth mother as barely able to speak and quotes the parents' attorney "[the birth
father] has been weeping like a baby. He knows he is doing the right thing, but it doesn't
make it easy." Id. Mrs. Rost said the settlement was "a very nice Christmas gift." For a
thoughtful analysis of the meaning and prevalence of characterizing the adoptee as a "gift,"
see Yngvesson, supra note 158.
164 141 CONG. REc. H6023-02, H6024, June 15, 1995.
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determine the identity and placement of their children. The ICWA provides a
"good cause" exception to transferring cases in which state and tribal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction.' 65 The ICWA does not define the exception, but
Federal guidelines suggest that passage of time between notice to the tribe and
the tribe's assertion of jurisdiction, parental absence and the child's lack of
contact with the tribe, or forum non conveniens-like grounds may constitute
good cause. 166 Nevertheless, state courts have, sometimes gratuitously, utilized
the Indian child's "best interests" in remaining with his or her current foster
parents to deny transfer. 167 In this context, "best interests" are synonymous
with psychological attachment and stability, otherwise known as the psycholog-
ical parent theory, a dominant Anglo-American norm in custody disputes.168
Both of these judicially created exceptions to the full or partial application
of the ICWA un-self-consciously apply some of the very norms that the ICWA
was designed to challenge. These norms include: "psychological" versus cul-
tural or biological ties; preference for nuclear and two-parent families versus
single parent or extended families; the supremacy of Anglo-American courts
and the notion that they are seats of unfettered, rational decision-making versus
the competence of tribal courts to make good decisions about children; and
children as private and connected only to current family verus children as part
of a political and cultural collective with multiple and changing attachments.
How does this happen, despite the clear statutory pronouncements
designed to minimize discretionary application of dominant norms? The obvi-
ous answer - at least from a critical perspective - is that those who represent
children's interests, as lawyers, judges, policy makers, social workers, etc.,
view children through the representatives' own norms - frequently the same
norms that are socially and legally dominant. Children are, after all, vessels
onto whom adults place or project their own values. Indeed, in many cases,
children cannot meaningfully articulate or identify their interests; they do not
have the developmental capacity in some cases to speak and in others to project
165 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(b) (the State "court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall
transfer such proceedings to the jurisdiction of the tribe...").
166 Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State Courts; Indian
Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67, 591 (1979).
167 E.g., Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Ct. App. Az
1991); In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988); see also A.P., 961 P.2d 706, 712-13
(Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (denying transfer because witnesses most relevant to disposition of
case were those who could testify regarding events in Kansas where the child had spent most
of his life in foster care). I use the term "gratuitously" because in some cases good cause
arguably existed on other grounds so a finding regarding the child's best interests was not
necessary to the court's denial of transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe. E.g., Maricopa County,
828 P.2d at 1249-51 (finding that the Pueblo unreasonably delayed asserting jurisdiction and
that location of most witnesses were in or near Phoenix); N.L., 754 P.2d at 869 (finding both
presence of witnesses in Oklahoma and child's best interests supported good cause denial of
transfer).
168 Davis, supra note 128, at 348 (noting that the psychological parent theory dominates
decision-making in child protection proceedings). This deference to psychological attach-
ments may also be encompassed within the "status quo bias" in decisionmaking. See Peggy
Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality,
and the Low, 2 ROUNDTABLE 139, 148-50 (1995) (describing the tendency of decisionmakers
to avoid making decisions that would change existing circumstances and avoid decisions that
would disrupt the status quo).
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their lives or choices over time. For example, the Rost twins, as newborns,
were clearly unable to identify, articulate, or press their interests, so they were
appointed attorneys at trial and appellate court levels. 1 69 By the time they were
five, the twins certainly identified the Rosts as their parents and their primary
family, along with the Rosts' other daughter. The twins may have known their
birth parents, grandparents, and their older brothers, but they could not assess
(if indeed anyone can) what they would be losing and gaining by staying with
the Rosts. They would not have the life experience or capacity to understand at
five-years-old what it might mean to have been reared with one family or the
other, as they would at twelve-year-olds, or as teenagers or parents. 17° These
developmental limitations are at the core of child dependency rights. This
group of rights both protects children, who cannot otherwise protect them-
selves, and places responsibility for making decisions about who should take
care of children in the hands of adults.
It is not surprising then that, at least in the context of Native American
children and families, the drive to protect children's dependency rights - their
safety, well-being and relationships to parents - seems to reproduce and protect
dominant norms and families while devaluing or demeaning non-dominant
families, despite clear federal and state legislative direction to the contrary. In
other words, even in a context designed to ameliorate the regressive aspects of
dependency rights, the hegemony of majoritarian values presumes in individual
cases that children's dependency needs are best met in a context of marital,
nuclear, white, middle-class families and by adults to whom the children are
psychologically attached.' 71 In this context, decisionmakers often underesti-
mate the value of the poor parents of color, the child's ties to them and to his or
her cultural heritage.172
IV. EMPOWERING CHILDREN: DEPENDENCY RIGHTS VERSUS CIVIL RIGHTS
The ICWA and its implementation starkly illustrate a dissonance between
dependency rights and civil rights. The former are part of an adult-oriented,
169 Bridget R, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 507, 515 n. 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In fact, apparently even
adults have some problem identifying the Rost twins' interests. The court noted that "the
twins have been represented by three different attorneys over the course of these proceedings
and have shifted sides in the controversy with each change of attorney." Id. For a discus-
sion of the contingency and indeterminacy of the "best interests of the child" standard, see
Annette R. Appell & Bruce Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False
Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 63, 78-82 (1995).
170 See DAVID M. BRODZINKSY, MARSHALL D. SCHECHTER, & ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG,
BEING ADOPTED (1992) (exploring how adoptees view adoption and identity at various
developmental stages).
171 The Rost case exemplifies the contingency of children's dependency rights. The Rost
twins had three different attorneys over the course of the case and each attorney had a differ-
ent position for the children. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 507, 515 n.2 (Cal. App. 1996) (first
attorney took position the ICWA should not apply; second attorney took position the ICWA
should apply; and appellate counsel took position the ICWA should not apply). It becomes
clear then that children's interests are indeterminate and that it is adults who decide what is
in the children's interests - not the children themselves.




not-child-empowering doctrine that relates to adult ideas about protecting chil-
dren, including with whom children should live and how they should be raised.
Adoption is a quintessential dependency right - the transfer of parental rights to
a child from one parent to another. Once bestowed, parental rights are adult
civil rights that limit state intervention and allow parents to express themselves
through the decision to have children and then to create and reproduce values
through child-rearing. Unlike parental rights, children's rights in the ICWA or
any dependency context are precisely about state determinations regarding cus-
tody and control, not the child's self-determination or liberation from custody
and control. Dependency rights have a complicated relationship to civil and
quasi-civil rights, but at root are based in state, rather than individual, power
that may be inconsistent with civil and quasi-civil rights.
The ICWA examples illustrate how children's dependency rights can con-
flict with parental civil rights. In the name of children's rights to, or interests
in, care or protection, dependency rights permit the government to assess which
families are families and which are not. This assessment can coercively substi-
tute the values of an external decision-maker (judge, social worker, legislature)
for the values of the parents. This awesome state power to shape or interfere
with the parent-child relationship can dictate the racial or cultural identity of a
parent or a child, as in the case of the ICWA. 173 The conflict between state and
parental power to rear children is present in child protection proceedings more
generally, but also exists in custody and adoption disputes, as well as family
welfare programs. 174
The ICWA also illustrates that children's dependency rights are not quasi-
civil rights because dependency rights do not promote the child's freedom but
instead dictate who will have custody of the child, how the child will be raised,
and how the child will be educated. These are rights that relate to, or arise out
of, the child's dependent status; they are not, for the most part, rights that the
child him or herself presses against the state. For with the exception of mature
or nearly mature minors, children need adults to identify and assert children's
often complex, shifting and competing interests regarding who can, and how to,
meet the child's dependency needs. It is the child's attorney or guardian ad
litem, the judge, and other adults who identify and press the child's interests,
not the child. Claims that children have independent substantive due process
rights in this context, then, are likely to be about adult autonomy, not
children's. 175
Civil rights, in contrast to dependency rights, are primarily tools to remove
government imposed or tolerated barriers to full and equal participation in civil
society. 176 Civil rights movements arise out of histories of cultural, racial, and
173 See supra notes 144 to 148 and accompanying text.
174 Appell, supra note 1, at 769-73.
175 Id. at 696-705.
176 Realizing the full promise of civil rights arguably requires affirmative removal of eco-
nomic and social, not just legal, barriers to full civil participation. See, e.g., IRIs MARION
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLMCS OF DIFFERENCE 18-27 (1990) (addressing institutional
means, though not ignoring the material requirements, for social justice); William E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1999) (rehearsing distrib-
utive approaches to material conditions for equal citizenship); Robin West, Rights, Capabili-
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gender distinctions that oppressed, disenfranchised, and excluded persons based
on their membership in a disfavored or non-dominant group. These rights
include the right of persons to exist on their own terms, to be authors of their
own lives, and be free from legal limits to participation in civil society by
virtue of their group belonging.
177
Some children's rights advocates place children in the civil rights camp
because children are, or are purported to be, like the groups who fought for
civil rights: categorized and disenfranchised; in other words, children are
excluded, discriminated against, and sometimes oppressed, all because of their
status as minors.1 78 As for other groups who seek civil rights, the law defines
children as dependent upon adult authority (with some exceptions) without
regard to their particular circumstances. Because of their youth, all children
are, perhaps arbitrarily, assumed to be incompetent for most purposes under the
law until they are eighteen. The state thus oppresses and excludes children
through laws that do not permit children to vote and forbids them many of the
privileges adults have, including deciding where to live, what entertainment to
enjoy, what medical care to receive, what religion to practice, and what school
to attend. Parents then are the primary oppressors because they make decisions
for and about children, including whether to relinquish parental rights, how to
educate their children, and with whom the children will associate. 179 Calls for
children's independence then may carry both quasi-civil and dependency rights
strains, depending on whether these calls seek to limit state or parental power.
It is true that "children" are an identifiable group - generally, human-
beings between the age of birth and eighteen years. It is also true that under
color of dependency law, children are subordinate to their parents, legal guardi-
ans or custodians and have only those freedoms that their parents or other care-
givers permit. Thus, children are not necessarily free to make their own deci-
sions about such basic liberties as travel, health care, associations, education or
religion. It is not clear, however, that this is the same type of group status or
oppression that undergirds civil rights or that freeing children from dependence
on adults is possible or liberatory. Although superficially, children may seem
like other disempowered groups, there are some critical distinctions. First,
unlike woman, racial and sexual minorities, the label of "child" does not carry
with it moral disapprobation. 180 We adults may negatively assess children's
ties and the Good Society, 69 FORtHAM L. REV. 1901 (2001) (arguing that material
preconditions are necessary to achieve autonomy).
177 See YOUNG, supra note 176, at 41 (1990) (defining oppression).
178 See, FELLMETH, supra note 70, at 22 ("children represent the politically weakest group-
ing of persons..."); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (likening
children to slaves); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1247 (1999) (comparing children to women who have historically been
legally oppressed, lacking personhood). Children's rights advocates also argue that children
should have a role in the political process. E.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing
Children's Participation in Policy Formation, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 751 (2003).
179 E.g., Arneson & Shapiro, supra note 80, at 138; James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion &
Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371,
1383-90 (1994).
180 See YOUNG, supra note 176, at 41 ("oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices
some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions...");
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judgment, veracity, and knowledge, but we do so in the context of our current
conceptions of childhood - as a time of cognitive, moral and physical develop-
ment from total dependence to near independence. As such, it is not clear that
these judgments are unjust or sufficiently like those judgments when made
about racial or sexual minorities or women who never outgrow their perceived
disability. Second, and relatedly, on a societal level, a gain in children's status
would not threaten the status of adults, as, for example, power gains for women
or, in a particularly timely vein, homosexual marriage, threaten the gender
hierarchy. 8'
Of course, children's status vis-A-vis parents is precisely hierarchical in
that each is defined in contradistinction to the other and parental status confers
power on parents. Nevertheless, the difference between children and other
oppressed groups in the dependency context is that children will always be
dependent on an adult, as long as children are unable to fend for themselves.
Children will not necessarily be free once one oppressor is removed. The
"oppression" will last roughly as long as their dependency, regardless of which
adult acts as the guardian. In other words, removing children's minority status
would not obviate their dependency.
Unlike other groups seeking civil rights, children will outgrow their disa-
bility. Thus, they will, generally on their eighteenth birthday, receive most of
the adult rights and privileges previously denied. In addition, society's treat-
ment (cabining) of children is less arbitrary than that of African Americans,
Native American, Latinos, Asians, and women, to name a few. 82 While one of
the most important aspects of civil rights is self-determination, children are, as
a developmental matter, limited in their ability to direct themselves.' 83 It is not
surprising, then, that older children who are more like adults developmen-
tally' 84 have more rights regarding their own lives. 185
Dependency rights govern the care of dependents and do not protect, or
even recognize, their self determination or moral agency. On the contrary,
dependency rights arise out of a history of social control and state action.
Treating dependency rights as a platform for empowering children is challeng-
ing because such rights regard who cares for children, how they care for chil-
dren, and what treatment children are entitled to within custodial relationships.
These are important considerations for the protection of children, but they are a
poor foundation for liberty, in part, because they are not grounded in liberty.
The existing Indian family exception cases reveal the problem of conflat-
ing liberty with dependency rights. In these cases, state courts held that the
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2366-67 (1997) ("status hier-
archies make traits morally relevant" in the sense that the higher groups group view the
lower group as unworthy).
181 See J.M. Balkin, supra note 180, at 2328-2331, 2361-62 (explaining the concept of
social group status as defined in opposition to other groups and the connection between such
status relationships and conceptions of what is natural).
182 Brighouse, supra note 68, at 703.
183 Id. at 701-02
184 Scott, supra note 65, at 555-56. Differences still exist. Id. at 591-93.
185 Id. at 555-56, 567-76; see also Ross, supra note 80 (asserting that more mature children




ICWA does not apply and may violate Indian children's equal protection and
substantive due process rights when their families of origin were not Indian
enough or were not family enough, as defined by Anglo-American courts.
186
Using dependency rhetoric regarding the children's psychological ties and need
to have access to non-Indian adoptive homes, these cases strike down a reme-
dial law designed to preserve the vital political and cultural connections of
Indian children to their families and tribes against dominant culture's centu-
ries-long programs to appropriate Indian children for itself. 87 In the end, the
children are still in custody - in the ICWA cases, the custody of parents who
better reflect dominant culture.
This scenario is distinct from that in Brown v. Board of Education,188
which applied the Equal Protection Clause to Black children. In Brown, the
equal protection claim was grounded in centuries of enslavement and segrega-
tion of Blacks by and from whites. The child and parent plaintiffs in Brown
sought access to the privileges and benefits of dominant culture while main-
taining their families and communities, and thus their cultural connections and
integrity. The equal protection sought in Brown related to the attainment of
social justice on the non-dominant community's own terms. The existing
Indian family exception is a creation of Anglo-American courts to usurp from
tribes and parents the determination of what is best for individual Indian chil-
dren. This usurpation does not give control to the children.
Similarly, the application of substantive due process doctrine to the Indian
child's relationship with substitute care-givers undermines the civil rights
aspect of the doctrine. The Constitution protects parental rights in part because
families are a forum for reproducing culture and independent democratic citi-
zens. 189 The roots and continued importance of the constitutional status of
family privacy are directly related to anti-subordination principles of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 90 In the context of coercive state inter-
vention into families, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized the
vulnerability of poor families and families of color against the massive
resources of the State and value-laden nature of custodial decision-making.191
The Supreme Court has never held that a child has a liberty interest in remain-
ing with psychological parents. On the contrary, the child's liberty interest is to
maintain the parent-child relationship until parental rights are lawfully termi-
nated. 192 Moreover, adults, not children, will necessarily decide in which rela-
tionship a young child's liberty interest resides, as in the case of the Rost
186 See supra notes 143-160 and accompanying text. The California cases also found Tenth
Amendment violations. Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 692, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); In re
Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 528-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
187 Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524-27.
188 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
189 Appell, supra note 1, at 709-11; see also supra text accompanying notes 10-23.
190 Supra text accompanying notes 10-23
191 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-62 (1982); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n. 36 (1977); see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989) (applying the ICWA).
192 Santosky, 555 U.S. at 760; see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 842-47 (discussing foster parents'
interest in a relationship with their foster child).
[Vol. 5:141
UNEASY TENSIONS
twins. 1 93 Thus, it is difficult to characterize such a right as liberating the child;
on the contrary, it is precisely a dependency right that promotes state power,
not individual freedom.
Clarity regarding what rights we are advocating for children is important:
whether the rights relate to freedom from arbitrary state action and freedom to
exercise autonomy, e.g., reproduction or speech; or whether rights are related
to protection, e.g., what is best for children. For, as the ICWA cases illustrate,
when rights are promoted because of children's dependency, then they are
likely to be no more than a question of competing adult values, in which domi-
nant values - those appreciated by the state - are likely to prevail. This state
interventionist aspect of children's dependency rights masks this cultural
hegemony because these norms are utilized in decisions about protecting indi-
vidual children who in many cases conveniently cannot speak for themselves.
Children's rights in these contexts have the content the decision-makers
choose194 and dependency rights are precisely about governmental notions of
what children need and how these needs must or should be met. These rights
are not about liberty or expression - at least of the child; instead, they are about
in whose custody the child will be or who will make the decisions for or about
the child. Thus, they are, at least from the child's perspective, the antithesis of
freedom or autonomy.
Although this essay's preliminary taxonomy of children's rights may be
imperfect, I hope it begins to raise some questions about the relationship
between child advocacy and justice. It seems that pressing children's depen-
dency rights without a full appreciation of their difference from, and connection
to, civil rights is not necessarily liberatory, empowering, or reformative. As
children's advocates, we may better serve children as a class if we ground our
agendas in larger theoretical frameworks regarding justice and the potential
regressive implications of enlarging children's dependency rights. This more
cautious approach may be more empowering for children in the long run.
193 The Rost twins' attorneys made those decisions. See supra text accompanying notes
169 -170. The attorney for the toddler Santos Y. chose. In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 692,
699. Adolescents generally have a voice in determining whether parental rights will be
terminated or they will be adopted. JoAN HOLLINGER, 1 ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE §2.08,
at 2-76.1 (2000).
194 Of course this is true of civil rights as well. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. RaV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
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